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FROM LEFT TO RIGHTS:
CIVIL LIBERTIES LAWYERING BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS

Laura M. Weinrib
Forthcoming, Law, Culture, and the Humanities

In the formative years of the modern First Amendment, civil liberties lawyers
struggled to justify their participation in a legal system they perceived as biased and
broken. For decades, they charged, the courts had fiercely protected property rights even
while they tolerated broad-based suppression of the “personal rights,” such as
expressive freedom, through which peaceful challenges to industrial interests might have
proceeded. This article focuses on three phases in the relationship between the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the courts in the period between the world wars: first,
the ACLU’s attempt to promote worker mobilization by highlighting judicial hypocrisy;
second, its effort to induce incremental legal reform by reshaping social values; and
third, its now familiar reliance on the judiciary to insulate minority views against state
intrusion and majoritarian abuses. By reconstructing these competing approaches, the
article explores the trade-offs—some anticipated and some unintended—entailed by the
ACLU’s mature approach.

“The decisions of the courts have nothing to do with justice.” 1 At the height of the
New Deal, that was the pithy assessment of Morris Ernst, General Counsel to the
American Civil Liberties Union. It was, perhaps, a surprising sentiment for a lawyer who
devoted his life to court-based constitutional change—indeed, who played important and
often foundational roles in the most celebrated legal advocacy organizations of the
twentieth century, including the NAACP, Planned Parenthood, and the National Lawyers
Guild, in addition to the ACLU.
That Ernst doubted judges’ abstract commitment to justice did not betoken a
general disaffection with law. A pioneer of cause lawyering, Ernst sought to rehabilitate
the judiciary as an effective tool for social and economic progress. But the justice he
pursued was mediated by popular contestation. In Ernst’s view, “the point of view of the
judge derive[d] from the pressure of public opinion” 2—which explains why he
orchestrated letter-writing campaigns to sitting judges in a number of celebrated cases.
The trouble, according to Ernst, was not that judges were capitulating to
extrajudicial pressures. That was both inevitable and desirable. Rather, the problem was
the failure of reform-minded Americans to comprehend and embrace the judiciary’s
function. Even as they grappled over constitutional meaning, the people had relinquished
their claims on the courts. The first chairman of the American Bar Association’s
Committee on the Bill of Rights chastised the bar for allowing “the active defense of civil
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liberty . . . to drift very largely into the hands of the elements of ‘the left.’” 3 Ernst,
conversely, indicted New Dealers for ceding the courts to the Right.
Ernst’s was one of many critical approaches to lawyering before the New Deal
settlement. In an era of judicial conservatism, civil liberties lawyers struggled to justify
their participation in a system they perceived as biased and broken. For decades, they
charged, the courts had fiercely protected property rights even while they tolerated broadbased suppression of the personal rights, such as expressive freedom, through which
peaceful challenges to industrial interests might have proceeded. For Ernst, the
appropriate corrective to Lochner-era legalism was not to dismantle the judicial branch,
but to reclaim it as an engine of social change, subject to democratic override. Others
defined their personal and professional duties in oppositional terms; the role of radical
lawyers, they insisted, was to show up the hypocrisy of the courts. Many others insisted
that civil liberties were best pursued through administrative, legislative, or extragovernmental means.
This article explores the competing approaches and ambitions of the ACLU’s
lawyers during the interwar period, with particular emphasis on their conceptions of
court-centered justice. It is an underlying premise of the article that the roots of the
modern civil liberties movement in America are intimately bound up with the labor
movement’s efforts to promote workers’ rights. 4 Indeed, the ACLU—which was the first
group to popularize the term civil liberties in the United States and helped to litigate most
of the seminal speech-protective cases of the interwar period and after—was explicitly
founded to defend labor’s rights to organize, picket, and strike. 5 Given the deeply
antagonist relationship between the judiciary and organized labor, exemplified by the
notorious labor injunction in addition to substantive due process, it is no accident that the
ACLU’s lawyers were skeptical of the courts. In its second year of operation, the new
organization issued a pamphlet on “The Supreme Court vs. Civil Liberty.” As evidence
of the Court’s transgressions, it featured such core labor cases as Hitchman Coal 6 and
Duplex Printing Press 7 alongside the Espionage Act decisions that would eventually
frame the origin story of the First Amendment. 8
Nonetheless, the ACLU consistently proved willing to use the courts when doing
so suited its cause. Co-founder Roger Baldwin would have preferred to rely on grassroots agitation and direct action, but he resigned himself to the fact that “the middle-class
mind works legalistically”—that “whenever rights are violated, the first thing they want
to do is get a lawyer and go to court.” 9 Unlike labor lawyers, many of whom spurned the
judiciary, the ACLU’s attorneys sought to enlist the courts to the civil liberties cause. 10
Even as they helped to draft and promote the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which stripped the
federal courts of injunctive power in ordinary labor disputes, ACLU lawyers urged
unions to seek injunctions against intransigent employers. They criticized their labor
allies for their stubborn adherence to principle, which stood in the way of concrete gains.
“It is almost like saying to the employers ‘we won’t use this because you do,’” one
ACLU pamphlet protested. 11 Employers were adept at generating public sympathy by
complaining of disorder. The workers, in response, would do well to “stir up the cry of
repression of civil liberty.” 12
The paper traces three phases in the campaign by ACLU advocates to pursue their
cause in the courts. These phases, of course, overlap, and if each was dominant for a
2
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time within the organization, all were always contested. Still, in broad strokes, they
capture a trajectory that both reflected and helped to shape a new confidence in the
judiciary among advocates of social change. Eventually, the ACLU came to regard “the
whole courts system, top to bottom, federal and state, [as] the proper and natural ally of
citizen’s rights.” 13 Indeed, for the mature ACLU, “with its appeal to law,” the judiciary
was “the essential forum.” 14 That unwavering faith in the judicial vindication of civil
liberties was virtually unimaginable in 1920, when the ACLU was founded.
The first phase, which was modeled on the “free speech fights” by prewar
radicals, sought to generate support for civil liberties by publicizing judicial defeats. 15
This strategy was premised on the assumption that courts were inherently antagonistic to
workers’ rights and that organized labor would do better to rely on alternative channels,
ranging from administrative tolerance to unadorned working class power. The second
envisioned incremental legal reform as a corrective to the inefficiencies and
inconsistencies of interest group politics. If courts simply implemented the preferences
of their social circles, as critics of the judiciary often contended, then the best means of
advancing progressive interests in the face of powerful political lobbies and hostile
majorities was to harness the persuasive power of sympathetic elites. That is, rather than
channel judicial losses into positive publicity, the organization sought to parlay public
support into judicial victories. The third and final phase is the most familiar because it
ultimately prevailed. In a period in which judicial review was uniquely vulnerable to
democratic attack, the ACLU recast the courts as an insulated haven for beleaguered
minorities and disfavored views.
On the surface, the ACLU’s approach proved wildly successful. By the late New
Deal, the organization was cooperating with a broad range of government actors and
private organizations, including the Department of Justice, the American Bar
Association, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, all of which openly endorsed civil
liberties. Conservative groups publicly celebrated the very ACLU-sponsored cases that
they had long castigated, invoking the Supreme Court’s halting defense of civil liberties
as a justification for judicial review. And yet, the vision that triumphed within and
outside the courts was double-edged. As the levers of power shifted, so too did the
beneficiaries of free speech and personal rights. The civil liberties that once had protected
picket lines from hostile judges and federal troops soon shielded employer distribution of
anti-union literature against regulatory intervention by the NLRB.
The ACLU of the late New Deal was an unusual social movement, if it can be
considered one at all. As Roger Baldwin put it in 1938, the ACLU had “no ‘ism’ to
promote except the Bill of Rights.” 16 Although it began as an arm of the labor struggle, it
had come to define itself in relation to a capacious idea—one that took no stake in the
merits of political or economic debate. Perhaps that transformation limits its usefulness as
a model of court-centered justice. Perhaps it functions as a cautionary tale about what
becomes of a movement that hitches itself to the courts. At the very least, it serves as a
powerful reminder that the prospects and possibilities of cause lawyering are inextricably
bound to the cause.
The actors described in this paper could not know the legacy of their choices. The
development of the anti-state, constitutional, and court-centered concept of civil liberties
that gained ascendancy by the onset of WWII was mired in contingency. It was the
3

product of international events, domestic politics, organizational pressures, and personal
ambitions. Nonetheless, civil liberties lawyers understood that their judicial strategy
entailed risks and tradeoffs. At a moment of profound uncertainty about the future of
judicial review, the decisions they made helped to define the stakes of constitutional
litigation—indeed, to preserve space for the courts as a restraint on majoritarian pressure
and an agent, however equivocal, for social change.
I. The Wages of Defeat
In the 1924 presidential campaign, the platform of Progressive Party candidate
Robert La Follette incorporated a longstanding progressive proposal. Pledging to abolish
“the tyranny and usurpation of the courts, including the practice of nullifying legislation
in conflict with the political, social or economic theories of the judges,” 17 La Follette
sought a constitutional amendment authorizing Congress to override Supreme Court
decisions that invalidated its democratically enacted statutes. That is, La Follette sought
to abolish judicial review of congressional legislation. And the newly established
American Civil Liberties Union, which would someday call the courts its truest and most
natural ally, heartily endorsed La Follette’s views.
La Follette’s proposal was not novel, let alone revolutionary. Twelve years prior,
no less a national hero than Theodore Roosevelt—also running for president on the
Progressive Party ticket—had advocated the “recall of judicial decisions” and considered
it “absolutely necessary for the people themselves to take control of the interpretation of
the constitution.” 18 At that time, La Follette himself had also embraced the campaign for
the recall of judges—a reform implemented in many western states—which, in theory,
permitted democratic majorities to redress perceived judicial usurpation in a much wider
range of cases than constitutional ones. 19 Indeed, the early years of the 1910s were
notable for a wholesale attack on the courts (or at least, a particular style of classical
legalism 20) across a broad band of the political spectrum. Populists and progressives
blamed Lochner-era courts for undermining the most important reform efforts of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, including rate regulation, the income tax, and
protective labor laws. Organized labor divided in its attitudes toward political methods
but united in unequivocal disdain for the courts; whatever their differences, Samuel
Gompers, Big Bill Haywood, and Eugene V. Debs all castigated judges for their casual
resort to labor injunctions to crush strikes and boycotts apparently authorized by
legislative majorities. 21 Even conservatives occasionally worried that perceptions of
judicial partisanship would undermine support for rule of law. 22
To combat these critiques, the American Bar Association launched a massive
public relations campaign under the auspices of a Committee To Oppose the Judicial
Recall. The bar’s pamphlets, public addresses, and “general propaganda” emphasized the
centrality of an independent judiciary to American traditions of governance and to
upholding individual rights. 23 But the interests the committee emphasized were seldom
the sort that animated either progressive reformers or future advocates of free speech.
Although it occasionally invoked “personal liberty,” 24 its professed concern for the “mass
of the people” extended almost exclusively to their property rights. 25 “The same law
which would deny protection to the rich or confiscate the property of corporations,” one
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committee report characteristically explained, “might take the cottage or the liberty of the
humblest citizen.” 26 Raising the specter of socialism, the ABA cautioned against
democratic expropriation—a threat that was all the more salient after the 1917 Russian
Revolution. 27 And with American entry into the First World War, German autocracy
made an equally compelling foil.
In his 1918 presidential address to the ABA’s annual meeting, Walter George
Smith warned that the wartime expansion of federal power would soon shade into
despotism. “With a suddenness difficult to realize,” he complained, “well nigh every act
of the citizen is put under federal regulation.” 28 The new menace he invoked was not the
Espionage Act, with its attendant authorization of administrative censorship, but the
intrusion of economic regulation on private contractual relations. To combat a threatened
railroad strike, for example, the federal government had “fix[ed] hours of labor and rates
of wages upon the transportation system.” 29 Such actions and, still worse, the passage of
constitutional amendments to legitimate government intrusions, threatened to “reverse the
natural order.” 30
In light of this longer history, what was most striking about the 1924 debate over
the congressional override of judicial decisions was how marginal Robert La Follette’s
position had become. According to Republican vice presidential candidate Charles G.
Dawes, the effects of La Follette’s 1924 proposal would be “disastrous.” Government
would be subject to the vagaries of political preference, “with demagogues in the
saddle.” 31 The mainstream movement to curb judicial excess had foundered on the
emergence of an equally untethered administrative state. Against a bureaucratic
behemoth indifferent to state prerogatives and individual rights, incumbent president
Calvin Coolidge defended the Supreme Court as “the very citadel of justice,” and his
Democratic opponent agreed. 32
It was no surprise, then, when the ACLU issued an open letter to the Democratic
and Republican candidates defending La Follette’s proposal and “prov[ing] that the
courts had been as flagrant violators of civil liberties as the legislative and executive
branches of government.” 33 Founded in 1920, the origins of the ACLU—and through it,
of the modern civil liberties in America—are intimately tied to the labor movement’s
efforts to promote workers’ rights. Indeed, the ACLU, which popularized the term civil
liberties in the United States and helped to litigate the most important free speech cases
of the interwar period, was explicitly founded to defend labor’s rights to organize, picket,
and strike. 34 For political, ideological, and historiographical reasons, the labor
entanglements of modern civil liberties advocacy have received insufficient scholarly
scrutiny. 35 Although the prevalence of early anti-radical and anti-labor suppression has
been amply documented, historians and First Amendment scholars have tended to assume
that Red Scare repression galvanized support for judicial enforcement of the First
Amendment. They have taken for granted that freedom of speech and assembly were
always conceived in constitutional terms, and that early proponents of expressive
freedom sought stronger judicial protection against state encroachment. In reality, the
architects of the modern civil liberties movement regarded the courts as antagonistic to
workers’ organizing efforts and preferred to pursue their goals through other means,
whether political mobilization or private economic power.
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In short, to the early ACLU, the courts were the problem rather than the solution.
Before the war, its leaders had believed (as influential member Clarence Darrow told the
Commission on Industrial Relations) that legal machinery was inaccessible to the poor
and responsive to the rich; paraphrasing Nobel laureate Anatole France, Darrow reflected
that “the law is perfectly equal; it provides that it is a crime for anybody to sleep under a
bridge, whether he is a millionaire or pauper.” 36 A decade later, the ACLU leadership
believed that courts simply reinforced existing imbalances in economic power. Felix
Frankfurter, who joined the ACLU just months after it opened shop, thought the Court’s
“occasional services to liberalism” would only legitimate judicial legislation. 37
In the face of wartime hysteria (what the ACLU called the “dictatorship of
property in the name of patriotism” 38), the future founders of the ACLU had looked past
their longstanding aversion to judicial power in an effort to vindicate civil liberties in the
courts. 39 Their efforts had yielded only disappointments and defeats. Conservative
judges had proven unwilling to expand their concern for individual rights to encompass
labor organizing or radical political advocacy. Faced with strong majoritarian support for
the wartime prosecutions, their progressive counterparts proved reluctant to buttress the
counter-majoritarian exercise of judicial power. 40 The eventual dissents of Justices Louis
Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., though they signaled an emerging liberal
aversion to state suppression of speech (coupled with lingering ambivalence about
judicial enforcement), appeared patently unlikely to change judicial practice. After all,
both justices had long dissented in the Court’s substantive due process cases, with
nothing to show for their persistence. When the ACLU compiled a list of factors
threatening civil liberties in the wake of the war, its first item was “the reactionary
decisions of federal and state supreme courts.” 41 The Abrams case, Holmes’s stirring
dissent notwithstanding, had left “the status of civil liberty hopeless so far as it is the
concern of the courts of law.” 42
And yet, even in its most radical years, the ACLU never entirely abandoned the
courts as a forum for advancing its goals. Reasoning from first principles, the ACLU
leadership preferred a world without labor injunctions and without judicial review.
Given the realities of the political system in which they found themselves, however, they
were not too scrupulous to use the judiciary where it suited their goals. Like the IWW
before it, whose free speech fights had aimed to awaken the working class by revealing
prosecutorial bias and judicial hypocrisy, the ACLU believed that judicial defeats, even
more than elusive victories, could generate support for the civil liberties cause (and
perhaps also for curbing the courts). Consistent with that view, the organization believed
that “reporting trials,” as compared with litigating them, had “much more probability of
result.” 43 It sent free speech organizers into the field to provoke arrest, and its lawyers
followed up with test cases in the courts. 44 In the early 1920s, the ACLU hoped that
publicizing its valiant struggles and inevitable losses would provide the impetus for
broad-based and meaningful change.
It was in this spirit that the ACLU pursued a policy that the organization’s labor
allies deemed dangerous and misguided. Like many labor legal defense groups, the
ACLU defended organizers and pickets against criminal prosecutions for unlawful
assembly and disorderly conflict. Where the ACLU parted ways from most of its labor
movement counterparts, however, was in its willingness to pursue injunctions against
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employers to inhibit interference with labor activity. Organized labor “regard[ed] the
injunction as a weapon which should be abolished,” and it was hesitant to “sanction it by
using it.” 45 The ACLU dismissed such concerns as excessively principled and practically
damaging. It sought instead to turn the power of the injunction against its ordinary
master, and it entreated labor lawyers to do the same.
In 1930, the ACLU issued a pamphlet titled Legal Tactics for Labor’s Rights,
condensed from a book that ACLU attorney Arthur Garfield Hays helped to write. (As
early as 1925, Hays had encouraged the ACLU to study the potential of “affirmative legal
action” to secure “labor’s civil rights.” 46) Drawing on Hays’s decade-long experience
seeking pro-labor injunctions for the ACLU, it summarized the organization’s policy “for
aggressive fighting in the courts to establish labor’s rights.” 47 It emphasized, however,
that litigation was effective even, or especially, when a legal loss appeared inevitable.
Judicial defeats garnered positive publicity and produced “a good moral effect,” it
explained. 48 The authors of the pamphlet anticipated the systematic denial of pro-labor
injunctions by the same judges who eagerly awarded ex parte injunctions against strikes
and picketing to aggrieved employers. They hoped that the discrepancy would buttress
labor’s claim that the courts had sacrificed labor’s “ancient legal rights of civil liberty” to
the material interests of industrial concerns. 49 In the unlikely event that their legal
campaign proved successful, so much the better. But winning, as a general matter, was
beside the point. “The vital thing for labor to realize, and to make labor attorneys
realize,” the pamphlet emphasized, “is that the chief object to be gained is, not the
winning of legal actions, but the bringing of them.” 50 A few high-profile losses might
convince open-minded Americans that unions were neither menacing nor anarchistic—
that the resort to drastic methods was thrust upon them by unresponsive courts.
The ACLU conceded that lawsuits, however successful, could never adequately
safeguard labor’s rights; only workers’ collective action could counter industrial power.
But if legal tools could ease the process of organizing, it was foolish for labor to spurn
them. As a tactical matter, there was “no conflict between pressing for strong
organization and at the same time seeking relief in the courts.” 51 Unions could elicit
popular support and energize the workers by foregrounding the judicial repression of civil
liberties. 52
II. Victory As Its Own Reward
In the mid-1920s, the ACLU faced an unexpected dilemma: with increasing
frequency, it began to win. At first, the small victories were curious anomalies and did
little to affect the broader direction of the organization. As the judicial successes
accumulated, however, the ACLU encountered a puzzling development. When ACLU
lawyers made bold and brazen claims of the kind asserted in the organization’s early
pamphlets—for example, that the First Amendment protected even patent advocacy of
violence—they habitually lost in court. Losing, of course, was fodder for ACLU’s
ongoing propaganda campaign on judicial hypocrisy. Increasingly, however, the old
strategy appeared inadequate and ill advised. Popular hostility toward the judiciary was at
a decades-long nadir, notwithstanding the many Taft Court decisions extending
substantive due process. According to the ACLU’s 1925 Annual Report, “widespread
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prosperity” had dulled the radical spirit; neither court-curbing legislation nor the general
strike remained on the horizon. 53 And yet, labor quiescence led police, prosecutors, and
judges to suspend the worst of their Red Scare methods and exercise some restraint. 54
Through incremental expansion of expressive freedom, the organization could carve out
space for organizing and education, with an eye toward future returns.
In practice, the new approach (which coexisted with the old) meant making
arguments about the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, not the
defendant’s First Amendment rights. It also entailed the defense of peaceful and wellrespected speakers rather than labor agitators and pickets. An ACLU publicity director
described the organization’s mid-century tactics in colorful terms. First, “the police of
Ameba, New Jersey, let us say, broke up a strike meeting held outdoors and beat up the
speakers.” Second, the ACLU (per the strikers’ invitation) sent a “stinging
communication” to the Ameba police; at the strikers’ next meeting, speakers stuck to
such venerated scripts as Declaration of Independence, but police intruded all the same.
Third, the ACLU arranged an independent test meeting, featuring “not strikers and labor
organizers, but a prominent lawyer, a famous bishop, a celebrated senator, two wellknown editors of respectable journals and a wealthy lady of liberal views.” The socially
prominent speakers emphasized expressive freedom, not the merits of the underlying
labor dispute. Often, local officials capitulated to the threat of negative press. “The
Ameba police listened with profound respect to these good people who were well dressed
and spoke in modulated tones,” and the ACLU notified the newspapers “that free speech
had scored a victory in New Jersey.” 55
Sometimes, however, the distinguished speaker was arrested and charged. The
most important such episode involved the prosecution for unlawful assembly of Roger
Baldwin himself, who helped to organize a free speech protest in Paterson, New Jersey
on behalf of striking silk workers. 56 When Baldwin was sentenced to six months in
prison, the ACLU divided over the best strategy on appeal: whether to challenge the
conviction on constitutional grounds, or rather, to argue the case on its sympathetic facts
as a “simple, clearcut, not too important illustration of a trial court gone wrong.” 57 Felix
Frankfurter (who served on the ACLU’s National Committee beginning in its first year)
captured the essence of the trade-off. The latter path, he acknowledged, might “seem to
be pedestrian stuff”; one could plausibly argue that it would “help the cause of civil
liberty more to have Baldwin go to jail than to have his conviction reversed.” 58 And yet,
Frankfurter had no qualms about recommending the conservative course. He had never
approved of “promoting propaganda by defeats in the court.” On the same grounds, he
opposed the decision of ACLU attorneys Walter Pollak and Walter Nelles to take the
cases of Benjamin Gitlow and Anita Whitney to the Supreme Court. “I count very low
the publicity of cumulative adverse decisions by the Supreme Court,” he advised Nelles
regarding the cases that generated two of the most important Holmes and Brandies
opinions of the 1920s. 59
Tellingly, Nelles had come to much the same conclusion. In a 1917 challenge to
the constitutionality of the Conscription Act—the first case in which he participated on
behalf of the National Civil Liberties Bureau, the organizational precursor to the
ACLU—Nelles had prepared his amicus brief to the Supreme Court with complete
loyalty to his underlying views and “with complete indifference to effect on the court.”
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Predictably, the approach had failed; indeed, the Supreme Court barely mentioned
Nelles’s argument, because it considered “its unsoundness … too apparent to require [it]
to do more.” 60 Rather than generate public outrage, the Court’s decision impeded the
NCLB’s fundraising and recruitment campaign. 61 During the intervening years, Nelles
had learned to make arguments that were legally plausible and popularly palatable. Such
concessions better served the ACLU’s long-term interests, as well as those of its clients,
who “quite reasonably” preferred not to go to jail. 62
For the remainder of the decade, the ACLU’s legal cases heavily emphasized
equities and evidence rather than constitutional limitations. Wherever possible, the
organization framed its arguments in terms of common law interpretation and statutory
construction. It also advocated procedural protections for criminal defendants, which it
considered the only surviving set of constitutional constraints that conservative judges
(concerned for the real or perceived integrity of the judicial process) would bother to
enforce. 63 Many ACLU allegiances grew out of the lawless roundups and administrative
deportations that characterized the Palmer Raids; late in the decade, the organization
would classify the “right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures” as an
integral part of its agenda and call for even greater attention to the “constitutional
guarantees of defendants in criminal cases.” 64
The ACLU routinely characterized the speech it defended as non-threatening,
consistent with social mores, and important to public welfare. If the ACLU could present
its defendants as “regular people” rather than dangerous “Reds,” it could capitalize on
swelling public sentiment that efforts by local police and federal officials to root out
radicals had gone too far. 65 It was crucial, though, to downplay the “suggestion that
reversal is sought in aid of a subversive social tendency.” 66 It might be possible to
“sustain on libertarian principles a right to assemble under circumstances alarming to
men of firmness and courage,” Nelles told Baldwin, “but you can’t tell judges that’s a
constitutional right. You’d simply be out of court.” 67
Instead of the right of agitation, the ACLU increasingly invoked the time-tested
justifications for free speech that lawyers and judges had long promoted. Robust public
discussion, they said before Justice Brandeis did, was necessary for self-governance in a
democracy (even as Roger Baldwin considered “political action under representative
government [to be] the very heart of violence” 68). Echoing Justice Holmes, they claimed
that the airing of minority views would enable the emergence of truth in the marketplace
of ideas (even as the organization argued that the corporate domination of the commercial
press sharply curtailed access to unbiased information and systematically skewed
debate). 69 Free speech would facilitate social progress, and the airing of pent up
grievances would defuse social conflict; suppression of dissent, they insisted, only
increased support for revolutionary causes (the very causes whose interests they had
pledged to serve). 70
To be sure, the ACLU drew on these justifications for civil liberties in its First
Amendment challenges. But as Nelles observed, reflecting on the ACLU’s loss in
Gitlow, his disquisitions on libertarian philosophy and “comparatively scholarly
adduction of history” had failed to persuade the majority of the Court that speech urging
overthrow of the government was protected by the Constitution. 71 Instead of the right to
strike, picket, or advocate violence, the ACLU expanded its involvement into other, less
9

controversial domains, where constitutional claims were more conceivable. It promoted
such values as academic freedom, sex education, religious liberty, and artistic expression.
It defended them by recourse to progressive arguments about social progress (casting
civil liberties as a prerequisite to the intelligent and effective exercise of state power) as
well as conservative arguments about individual autonomy and state overreaching. In so
doing, it gradually assembled these formerly disparate strands with conflicting political
valences into a single civil liberties bundle. 72
In part, the change in direction reflected a change in personnel. When the ACLU
was founded, only three of its twenty executive committee members were lawyers. 73
Over the course of the decade, however, attorneys played an increasingly important role.
Arthur Garfield Hays and Morris Ernst were appointed general counsels and expanded
the organization’s legal work. 74 Despite their very real concerns about judicial abuses,
both were comparatively optimistic about the potential for legal change. But they also
understood the constraints of legal argument, the practical limitations imposed by legal
precedent. Moreover, though they were sincerely committed to labor’s right to organize,
they were liberals, not radicals, and their belief in expressive freedom was deeply held,
not nakedly instrumentalist, as critics alleged of some of their colleagues. In fact, Hays
argued at a Ford Hall Forum in 1928 that radicalism was misguided and that “the solution
of our economic problems must be accomplished by education and law, not by
revolution.” 75 Both Hays and Ernst regularly pursued speech claims outside the labor
context in their private law practice; both, for example, defended publishers against
obscenity charges. Both lawyers, in short, were liberal individualists, and they brought
their liberal sensibilities to the ACLU. 76
As successful litigators, Hays and Ernst were especially attuned to judicial
psychology. During the Progressive Era, critics of the judiciary had often emphasized the
infiltration of ideological commitments and political preferences into the work of
judging. 77 Some accused judges of outright allegiance to industrial interests, either
through graft or patent favoritism. Others sketched more complicated pathways.
Theodore Schroeder, leader of the early twentieth-century Free Speech League and an
early advocate of expressive freedom, linked judges’ predispositions to an “unconscious
economic determinism, controlling the judicial intelligence.” 78 Insiders occasionally
validated such observations. The chief justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court,
Walter Clark, observed that judges often began their legal career as corporate attorneys
and speculated that they were “unconsciously biased in favor of views they held before
they went on the bench.” 79 There was general agreement that judges were products of
their times, alert to social pressures and sensitive to the opinions of their peers.
The rejection of the classical legal model, premised on judges’ neutral pursuit of
justice through abstract principles and legal rules, led many liberals to repudiate the
courts. For Hays and Ernst, by contrast, judges’ susceptibility to social pressures
presented opportunities. The first was the strategic value of judicial appointments. At
the state level, advocates of judicial recall had assumed that judges subject to public
scrutiny would be more responsive to popular pressures. 80 Ernst saw similar potential in
judicial appointments. “Before any person is appointed to the bench in the future, there
should be a very stringent cross examination by the proper committees of Congress as to
the man’s economic faith,” he wrote to Heywood Broun. “It is about time that we got
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away from the idea that there is such a thing as a good lawyer or a bad lawyer. He is
either a man of our prejudices or of other prejudices.” 81
More important, the ACLU’s lawyers believed the organization could capitalize
on liberal sentiment to move the law gradually in its favor. If judges were persuaded by
the opinions of their social peers, as they believed, then the key to judicial success was to
secure support from sympathetic elites. That is precisely the course that the ACLU
adopted. It ran advertisements in newspapers and progressive journals, featuring
endorsements from distinguished public figures, with the hope of swaying public
opinion. 82 Sometimes, it targeted judges directly, soliciting letters to the court from
prominent lawyers, judges, academics, and public intellectuals. Some of the ACLU’s
members and correspondents advised against these methods, including Learned Hand,
Felix Frankfurter, and Roscoe Pound. 83 After extensive deliberation, the organization’s
lawyers persevered, reasoning that “the character of political cases, which in their very
nature involve much publicity unfavorable to the defendant,” rendered it “permissible and
ethical even for a member of the bar, to endeavor to secure publicity for the other side of
the facts.” 84
Within the ACLU leadership, many assumed that courts were “pretty accurate
interpreters, somewhat after the fact, of the mores.” 85 Morris Ernst went further, arguing
that courts—rather than presenting a counter-majoritarian difficulty or even adapting
slowly to changing social norms 86—were more open than legislatures to popular
persuasion. It was an overarching theme of social criticism and academic literature in the
1920s that Congress succumbed to special interests and that legislation often foundered
on the opposition of influential voting blocs. 87 Ernst thought that federal judges, because
of judicial tenure, might resist the donors and lobbies to which legislatures were
beholden. His concept of “nullification,” which turned on judicial erosion and executive
non-enforcement of outmoded or undesirable laws, assumed that judges and
administrators were better insulated against political distortions than the putative
representatives of the people. 88 Unlike the political branches, he argued, courts were free
to embrace democratic change. 89
The defining feature of this intermediate stage in the ACLU’s evolving attitude
toward the judiciary was its essentially incrementalist approach to litigation. No longer
did the courts serve simply as a reactionary foil to the unmediated power of mass
mobilization or concerted economic action. As its utopian vision receded into the
horizon, the ACLU had come to understand the courts as a useful check on administrative
excess and majoritarian intolerance in a second-best world. Indeed, in 1930—even as its
National Committee on Labor Injunctions promoted the Norris-LaGuardia Act—its
National Committee for Freedom from Censorship helped secure passage of a bill
transferring customs censorship power to the federal courts. 90 The ACLU was no judicial
booster, and many of its members still preferred to pursue the civil liberties agenda
through other institutions. 91 Still, by the early 1930s, the ACLU was no longer inclined to
“fight against the courts.” 92
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III. The Turn to Rights
A deep irony pervades the ACLU’s mature attitude toward the courts, which
emerged during the 1930s. The founding commitment of the ACLU was a robust right of
agitation—a right to challenge the existing industrial and political order through direct
action by organized labor. During the New Deal, for the first and only time in American
history, a substantial part of the government shared the ACLU’s early understanding of
civil liberties, as well as the organization’s early desire to curb the authority of the courts.
And yet, at the precise moment when its project became possible, the organization
moderated its conception of civil liberties as a vehicle for fundamental social change. In
its place, it promoted a value-neutral vision of civil liberties based on constitutional
protections, secured through the federal courts and against the state.
The election of Franklin D. Roosevelt precipitated sweeping changes with respect
to the ACLU’s agenda. Those changes threatened the precarious civil liberties coalition
that the organization had worked hard to assemble. Over the course of the decade, ACLU
supporters would split over federal oversight of the radio, the extension of free speech to
Nazi marches, and the civil liberties implications of racial discrimination. 93 The most
important fracture in the civil liberties alliance, however, stemmed from New Deal labor
policy. The core of the conflict was the various constituencies’ competing attitudes
toward state power and the federal courts. 94
New Deal labor legislation marshaled the power of the state to secure labor’s right
to organize. The statutory framework previewed in the National Industrial Relations Act
and, after a significant overhaul, perfected in the National Labor Relations Act reflected a
compromise approach to government involvement in labor relations. The NLRA
foreswore compulsory arbitration, and it preserved the resort to economic weapons
among labor and industry alike. It nonetheless forced reluctant employers to recognize
and bargain with a union when a majority of its employers elected collective
representation, substantially abrogating employers’ common law prerogatives in the
process. More to the point, it explicitly recognized a right to strike, free from employer
retaliation. And it established an administrative body, the National Labor Relations
Board, to police collective bargaining and ensure that both parties played by the rules. 95
Established unions overwhelmingly supported the new approach, though there
were holdouts. Among them were the dedicated voluntarists within the conservative craft
unions, who were wary of intervention by a federal government that had generally acted
to undermine their interests. 96 On the other end of the spectrum were the small radical
and Communist unions that the ACLU had disproportionately defended, for whom the
implementation of majority rule and exclusive representation portended substantial
declines in power. These militant minorities argued that the state would inevitably serve
the interests of capital and, by making minor concessions, erode the mounting movement
for working class power. 97 The core ACLU leadership condemned the NLRA on much
the same basis 98; Baldwin called the class war the “central struggle involving civil
liberties” and insisted that administrative meddling would undermine labor’s strength. 99
On this view, labor could advance “only through its own economic power, not through
dependence on legislation.” 100

12

Within the ACLU, Baldwin’s vision encountered substantial resistance. Among
the organization’s longtime members were many labor leaders and New Dealers who
lined up behind the NLRA. 101 When Baldwin issued a letter to Robert Wagner
withholding support for his pending bill, some of them threatened to resign. 102 After all,
the radical anti-statism of the ACLU’s founding leadership put its adherents in odd
company. As Baldwin acknowledged, the major opposition to the Wagner Act came
from “employers still wedded to laissez-faire economics.” 103 Baldwin insisted that the
liberty he defended—“the freedom to agitate for social change without restraint”—was
different in kind. 104 Still, it shared a certain similarity with Lochner-era understandings
of economic liberty championed by “those rugged defenders of property rights,” the
American Liberty League. 105
With the debate over Wagner Act, the ACLU faced head on the continued
viability of its founding aspirations. The right of agitation was rooted in opposition to
state power. As early as the First World War, the founders of the ACLU had abandoned
their Progressive Era confidence in administrative solutions to civil liberties problems.
They continued to advocate administrative moderation (free speech, as Ernst put it, had
largely “become[] an administrative problem”) but they worried about overzealous
administrators. 106 Their deep state skepticism was out of step with the labor movement’s
new preference for government intervention to counterbalance entrenched “capitalistic
interests” in a “modern industrial country.” 107 But the ACLU, too, had changed in its
fifteen years of operations. In the 1920s, to enhance its clout and to improve its chances
in the courts, the ACLU had expanded its base of support. Its involvement in such cases
as Pierce v. Society of Sisters and the Scopes trial had buttressed its belief that a meddling
state menaced more than labor. 108 Many of its more recent members were only
incidentally interested in the rights to picket or strike. Indeed, the organization’s
conservative critics alleged that the ACLU had solicited supporters on false pretenses—
that it had recruited “genuine Liberal[s]” by pretending it was “primarily a defender of
artistic freedom against the throttling hand of censorship.” 109 By the mid-1930s, what
tied together the diverse membership of the ACLU was a mistrust of state intrusion into
the dissemination of ideas, personal morality, and private life.
The upshot of this fragile consensus was a perceived need to separate state
policing of economic activity from state censorship of speech. For lawyers like Arthur
Garfield Hays and Morris Ernst, as for other New Dealers, the rights to organize, picket,
and strike were mere manifestations of a general commitment to expressive freedom. 110
Far from interfering with those rights, the Wagner Act extended them administrative
protection—and for a substantial majority of the ACLU’s national membership, that was
the end of the inquiry. They were sympathetic to workers’ struggle for higher wages and
better labor conditions, but they did not understand those ambitions as civil liberties
concerns. And they were therefore willing to accept state regulation of labor relations,
even if its effects were counter-revolutionary, as long as expressive freedom was
preserved. 111 In this spirit, Judge Charles Amidon, who headed the ACLU-sponsored
National Committee on Labor Injunctions, advised against carrying on “campaigns
against economic wrongs” where civil liberties were only incidentally involved. 112
Alexander Meiklejohn likewise thought it was a mistake for the organization “to engage
in industrial disputes instead of fighting for the maintaining of civil liberties in
connection with them.” 113 When the ACLU was founded, its leadership had believed it
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“absurd to expect opponents of the cause of labor to join with us in the application of the
general principle” of expressive freedom. 114 And yet, during the 1920s, the ACLU had
engineered exactly that. By expanding into new realms and incorporating new
constituencies, the organization had generated wide-ranging support for a vision of civil
liberties based on free speech. In the process, the ACLU had unwittingly altered its core
purpose.
Shortly before passage of the NLRA, the ACLU rescinded its opposition to the
bill. Within months, the organization numbered among the statute’s staunchest
supporters (indeed, it soon celebrated the Wager Act as the New Deal’s greatest
achievement in the civil liberties field). 116 And yet, if passage of the Wagner Act helped
to crystalize the scope of the ACLU’s agenda—namely, the personal liberties contained
within the Bill of Rights—it did nothing to settle the question of how or where the
organization would seek enforcement of the rights it defended. 117 By the early 1930s,
many members had reluctantly accepted the courts as a useful forum for raising civil
liberties claims. The organization had scored some notable successes, including
Stromberg v. California. 118 But the likelihood that the Supreme Court would invalidate
the NLRA rekindled internal opposition to advancing civil liberties in the courts. As soon
as the statute took effect, the American Liberty League launched an aggressive campaign
to overturn it. With the weight of precedent on its side, it argued that Congress’ intrusion
on contractual freedom and abrogation of employers’ property rights, not to mention its
exercise of expansive federal power, were incompatible with the United States
Constitution and bound to be struck down. Many within the ACLU were determined to
avoid that outcome at all costs. 119
115

In the end, then, it was enactment of the NLRA that pushed the ACLU to clarify
its substantive commitments and the legal fate of the statute that forced it to face squarely
its relationship to the courts. Even before President Roosevelt announced his judiciary
reorganization plan, the ACLU was vigorously debating the very question that it had
taken for granted when it defended the 1924 Progressive Party platform against
Democratic and Republican attack. Once again, longtime members were at loggerheads.
Those who opposed judicial review charged their opponents with exaggerating the very
civil liberties victories the ACLU had secured. Defenders of the judicial model countered
that they were “mak[ing] the Court’s record worse than it is.” 120 Many applauded the
Court’s January 1937 decision in De Jonge v. Oregon, argued by ACLU attorney and
Board member Osmond Fraenkel, which overturned the conviction of a Communist Party
organizer under a criminal syndicalism law. 121 John Haynes Holmes, who would soon
serve as chairman of the ACLU’s Board of Directors, urged the organization to stake its
position based on the Bill of Rights, not labor legislation. “[T]he United States Supreme
Court, so far as civil liberties is concerned, is for us and not against us,” he insisted, “and
we should be for and not against the Court.” 122
With the hope of issuing an organization-wide statement, the ACLU solicited the
views of its “eminent lawyers.” 123 Unsurprisingly, the survey generated a broad range or
responses. Some participants considered judicial enforcement of civil liberties to be
unnecessary and preferred to curtail the power of the courts. Others, including Lloyd K.
Garrison—who had served as the first chair of the original NLRB before assuming the
deanship of the University of Wisconsin Law School—worried about “giving majorities
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too much say over minorities.” 124 Still others worried about “executive arbitrariness”
rather than majoritarianism and considered the Supreme Court to be a more effective
safeguard against “the expansion of the executive power into dictatorship.” 125 Socialist
leader Norman Thomas would have restricted the Court’s review of Congress’ “economic
and social” program but preserved its authority outside those domains. 126
All told, a majority of respondents thought the Court should retain its power of
judicial review in some form. But several would have required a supermajority to
invalidate federal laws, and some favored proposals to authorize a congressional veto of
constitutional decisions. Others preferred to ease the requirements for constitutional
amendment. There was only one issue on which all respondents agreed: all considered it
acceptable to strip the due process clause of its substantive sweep and limit it to
procedural matters, as long as a carefully worded provision made the Bill of Rights
binding on the states. That, of course, is essentially the result that the Supreme Court
itself eventually reached, albeit as a matter of judicial interpretation rather than statute or
constitutional amendment. 127
As events unfolded, the ACLU’s effort to reach consensus on a court-curbing
proposal proved somewhat beside the point. In February 1937, President Roosevelt
announced his own solution to the Supreme Court problem, his notorious “Court-packing
plan,” which further polarized the ACLU. Many liberals who were sympathetic to
democratic curtailment of judicial review regarded the President’s proposal as a
dangerous exercise of unilateral executive power. 128 Others accepted Court-packing as
an emergency measure—including La Follette’s son Robert La Follette Jr., now chair of
the Senate Civil Liberties Committee that the ACLU had helped to organize, who
emphasized that “no kind of legal guaranty has ever been able to protect minorities from
the hatreds and intolerances let loose when an economic system breaks down.” 129 Unable
to reach agreement, the ACLU board took no official position on the issue, though it did
issue a report by Osmond Fraenkel, which concluded that the Court had signaled a new
commitment to expressive freedom and minority rights, even if historically it had “more
often failed to protect the Bill of Rights than preserve it.” 130
In March 1937, in its famous “Switch in Time,” the Supreme Court upheld the
Washington state minimum wage law at issue in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, all but
ensuring the eventual defeat of President Roosevelt’s judicial reorganization bill. 131 But it
was the Court’s decision two weeks later, in Jones and Laughlin Steel, that effectively
settled the ACLU’s position on judicial review. 132 Notably, the ACLU considered Jones
and Laughlin Steel to be a civil liberties victory. In upholding the Wagner Act, the Court
classified “the right of employees to self-organization” as a “fundamental right.” 133 A
few months later, it assumed that “members of a union might … make known the facts of
a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.” 134 In
short succession, the ACLU secured a spate of First Amendment victories involving
Communists and Jehovah’s witnesses. 135 At the dawn of the new decade, in Thornhill v.
Alabama, the Supreme Court would finally declare that peaceful labor picketing is a
constitutionally protected exercise of free speech. 136
At the end of 1930s, the ACLU split once again over the propriety of
administrative intervention into labor relations. One contingent defended the NLRB’s
decision to prohibit employers from distributing anti-union literature to their employees,
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and the other, invoking the ACLU’s longstanding line between expression and physical
violence, criticized the agency for curtailing free speech. The differences between them
ultimately proved irreconcilable, prompting the expulsion of communists from the ACLU
board and the resignation of many of the organization’s longtime members. That
controversy, however, turned mostly on the scope and meaning of the First Amendment,
not the appropriate arbiter of the dispute. 137 Members disagreed over the desirability of
deference to administrative fact-finding and remedies, but few doubted that in the final
analysis, it fell upon the courts to construe the Bill of Rights.

IV. Law, Labor, and Justice
Looking forward from 1940, the ACLU leadership was satisfied that the
organization’s investment in the judiciary had paid off. Internal squabbles
notwithstanding, there was broad public and political approval of the ACLU’s mature
vision of civil liberties, that is, robust judicial enforcement of the personal liberties
protected by the Bill of Rights. In 1920, most Americans had decried civil liberties as a
cover for subversive activity. Liberty, they insisted, did not mean license; neither public
policy nor the First Amendment countenanced subversive speech. A mere two decades
later, the ACLU’s legal strategy was widely respected and broadly emulated, and free
speech was a fundamental American value. By 1940, American liberals eager to protect
free speech “[took] comfort in evidences of an enlightened judiciary.” 138
And yet, from the perspective of the organization’s early goals, the path forward
was more ambivalent. Just one year after Thornhill v. Alabama, the Supreme Court would
retreat from its protection of picketing. Indeed, it was Felix Frankfurter—newly
appointed to the Supreme Court—who would write the Court’s opinion in Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, upholding a state court injunction against
peaceful picketing where a union had previously engaged in violence. 139 Persuaded,
perhaps, by the gravity of his new office, Frankfurter voiced a principle that the judiciary
had long promoted and the ACLU had long opposed, namely, that “an utterance in a
contest of violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an
instrument of force.” 140
I argue elsewhere that the ACLU not only endorsed the new order, but helped to
create it. 141 The New Deal’s so-called Constitutional Revolution is ordinarily understood
to contain two related part. In 1937, in West Coast Hotel v. Parish and NLRB v. Jones
and Laughlin Steel, the Court retreated from its review of social and economic
legislation. 142 Two years later, in its famous fourth footnote of Carolene Products, it
signaled its intention to rigorously review state and federal intrusion on free speech and
minority rights. 143 Today, the two pieces are thought to form a seamless whole. 144 In the
1930s, however, that second step was just as unexpected as the first.
When the ACLU’s New Deal allies pushed to curb the authority of the courts,
they sought to reallocate responsibility for civil liberties enforcement, as well as the
nation’s social and economic program, to the political branches. It was in this spirit that
the National Lawyers Guild republished a pamphlet by the International Juridical
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Association, a leftist law reform organization with which the ACLU often collaborated,
which concluded that “there can be no true enforcement of the Bill of Rights in the
interests of persons instead of wealth, except by the elected representatives of the
people.” 145 With the “Switch in Time,” contemporaries assumed that the Supreme Court
would defer to legislators and regulators across the board. Few anticipated or even
desired that Carolene Products would follow.
The ACLU, almost alone among liberal and labor organizations, was more
skeptical of the state than of the judiciary, and it helped to cultivate a new role for the
courts. Between 1937 and 1939, it aggressively litigated constitutional claims. Freed
from its perennial fear of legitimating Lochner, it asked the Supreme Court to strike
down state statutes and local ordinances limiting the rights to public assembly and
freedom of speech. It portrayed purportedly neutral laws as incursions on the Bill of
Rights. Where before it had proceeded cautiously, emphasizing the insufficiency of the
evidence or the inadequacy of the pleadings, it boldly invoked constitutional limitations
on legislative and regulatory power. 146
In this task, it sought assistance less from the liberal and labor groups it had long
courted than from conservative groups concerned to preserve a role for the courts. 147 To
combat the Court-packing plan, the American Bar Association had eagerly invoked the
Supreme Court’s recent civil liberties decisions in its defense of judicial review. 148
Recognizing that arguments based on the preservation of property rights and opposition
to redistribution no longer mobilized popular support, the ABA launched a public
relations campaign depicting the Supreme Court as a champion of minority rights. Its
pamphlets and radio programs promoted the very cases that the ACLU had litigated and
that most members of the bar had vociferously opposed. 149 Rather than call the Bar to
task for its hypocrisy, the ACLU embraced its new ally and pledged “full cooperation”
with the ABA’s new Committee on the Bill of Rights, which was founded in 1938. 150
Soon, the ABA managed to convince its corporate clients that the First Amendment could
substitute for Lochner-style substantive due process to protect their prerogatives in the
Court. The ACLU actively encouraged this view. 151
The ACLU leadership had not (yet) given up on labor’s substantive goals. It
hoped that a judicial check on government intrusion would provide adequate space for
labor to assert its own power, relying on the old mantra that workers were best served by
a strong union, not a strong state. 152 For their part, industrial groups expected that the
judiciary, given appropriate tools and an acceptable political valence, would continue to
defend their interests against an unshackled state. As ABA president Frank Hogan put it
in his address announcing the creation of the Committee on the Bill of Rights,
constitutional protections for personal rights might also be invoked “when the crushed
toes were encased in patent leather footwear of the wealthy, or the rights denied or the
privacy invaded were those of the business corporation.” 153 In short, the “Constitutional
Revolution” contained within it the seeds of Citizens United. 154
History cannot tell us whether law is compatible with justice. Still, there is much
to be gained by exploring how legal actors have understood the relationship between the
two. Recovering past perceptions of law’s possibilities can point the way to unfamiliar
and unexpected approaches to legal change. It can also alert us to hidden dangers. It can
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challenge us to confront whether, after intoning them time and again before judge and
public, we have begun to believe our own fictions.
The early architects of the modern civil liberties movement—and, more
tendentiously, of American constitutional liberalism—did not believe that courts were
dispensers of justice. Some considered them an untapped resource: an instrument of state
power, like any other, that might be steered toward desirable ends. Others thought the
dangers of a strong state exceeded the dangers of an unconstrained industrial
capitalism—that justice was achievable “by economic power and organized pressure
alone,” 155 and that the judiciary (though itself, concededly, a state actor) was the
institution best equipped, by structure and precedent, to insulate labor’s most powerful
weapons against government intervention. Before the First World War, Clarence Darrow
emphasized the “impossibility of the weak to use the machinery” of the law, and the
“ease with which power can use it against the weak.” 156 By the time President Roosevelt
announced his Court-packing plan, Darrow had revised his views. He continued to
believe that it was “sometimes impossible” to “reconcile the law with justice and human
progress.” 157 Still, he rose to the defense of the institution he had long condemned.
“There isn’t much freedom anyway,” he observed, “and we might as well hang on to
what we have.” 158 A few years later, many within the ACLU made a still bolder claim.
They came to regard the judicial protection of civil liberties as the signature contribution
of American democracy, as well as the organization’s foremost goal. 159
The ACLU’s unfolding approach to litigation during the interwar period yields
several basic insights into the nature of legal advocacy. First, there are other avenues for
the pursuit of constitutional change than court-centered litigation. This, of course, is a
familiar notion from the literatures on popular constitutionalism and constitutionalism
outside the courts, which have amply documented the limited capacity of the judiciary, in
comparison with the political branches, to secure substantive equality and economic
justice. 160 And yet, the same insights apply in areas that legislators and administrators
have neglected—indeed, in the domain of “negative” rights, including expressive
freedom, where state action has often been regarded as a threat instead of a solution. 161
Between 1920 and the late New Deal, advocates of labor’s rights pursued their agenda
through legislation, administration, and economic pressure in addition to the courts. The
ACLU, too, experimented with these methods, and many within the organization believed
its objectives would fare best by curbing judicial power.
It is telling that the ACLU understood the constitutional enforcement of free
speech as fully compatible with constraining courts’ injunctive power in the context of
labor disputes. In fact, for the ACLU, the two approaches served the same goal. Just as
the labor movement had sought to mark off labor relations as an arena of private power
by curtailing “government by injunction,” the Supreme Court’s emerging civil liberties
jurisprudence maintained state “neutrality” in the face of competing interests. 162 For the
ACLU leadership, the two developments were variations on a theme, and the
organization was almost as instrumental in securing the Norris-LaGuardia Act as it was
in establishing a constitutional right to free speech. 163 The ACLU’s longstanding
commitment to the right of agitation turned on shielding strikes and boycotts from state
interference. Whether that end was achieved by curtailing the jurisdiction of the federal
courts or by expanding the scope of the First Amendment to encompass labor activity
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was a matter of expediency—however inconsistent the strategies appeared vis-à-vis
judicial power.
Second, adopting a court-based strategy for effecting social change does not
necessarily imply an endorsement of the judicial forum. There are multiple ways of
pursuing justice through the courts. In its early years, the ACLU anticipated judicial
defeat. By raising consciousness of law’s injustice, it hoped to instantiate justice through
extra-legal means. 164 The early ACLU described the right of agitation as a “natural
right—prior to and independent of constitutions.” 165 Rather than pushing law to
accommodate moral claims, it sought to modify public morality through a critique of law.
That is, by exposing law’s failings, it hoped to move the class war to the arena of private
power.
Gradually, the ACLU moderated its structural critique. In its second phase, it
believed that incremental change could move the courts toward a more just result, even if
the system itself was irredeemable. Its leaders still anticipated that meaningful social
change was beyond law’s domain, but they were willing to use the courts to preserve the
channels of communication and the tools of collective action. Only in its final phase did
the ACLU come to understand the courts as an implement of justice—as the sole
sustainable constraint on the tendency of popular majorities to trample minority rights.
Third, and more tentatively, the ACLU’s eventual embrace of constitutional
liberalism gestures toward the limits of law’s neutrality—a basic component of rule-oflaw—as a marker of legal justice. Underlying imbalances in the allocation of power and
resources made any such conclusion untenable. In Darrow’s pithy formulation, “the law
is equal, all right, but it catches the poor man only.” 166 By the same token, it was a
frequent refrain of the early ACLU that groups secured their legal rights “in proportion to
their power to take and hold [them].” 167 The ACLU’s lawyers understood the allocation
of rights as a zero-sum game, and they acknowledged that their goal was to upset the
existing order. To cite a poignant example, some went so far as to defend the sit-down
strike in civil liberties terms: neither the state nor the courts, they argued, were
constitutionally empowered to defend the rights of property when the “right of agitation”
was at stake. “I suppose that almost everything that Labor has done for itself on
emancipation was illegal at first and was finally legalized, because men had the courage
to defy the law,” one longtime member mused. 168 Rarely are rights claimants so
forthright about the trade-offs that their assertions of rights entail. 169
Still, the ACLU’s lawyers recognized that the wholesale redistribution of rights
was as unlikely in a constitutional democracy as was the wholesale redistribution of
property. To be sure, they meant to dismantle one system of rights, based on property and
contractual autonomy, and replace it with another. But they also assumed that the legal
system was incapable of accommodating truly radical claims, and they understood the
need to make concessions to existing stakeholders.
Through its cooperation with conservative lawyers, the ACLU began to reimagine
the courts as a check on government’s reach rather than an arm of the state. Where its
New Deal allies endorsed free speech as a prerequisite for legitimate state compulsion in
social and economic life, the ACLU regarded censorship as an inevitable outcrop of
government authority and sought to undermine the state’s monopoly on coercion. It
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hoped that on a level playing field, workers’ private collective strength could effectively
counter the power of capital. Its onetime allies reminded it, unavailingly, that background
inequalities made its vision fanciful—that employer speech was “a protected commodity
in a monopoly market.” 170
Finally, and relatedly, tracing the ACLU’s unfolding attitude toward the courts
reveals the difficulty of defining justice apart from an actor’s participation in the effort to
achieve it. Over time, the organization refined its goals for changing circumstances and
adapted its rhetoric for new allies. In a handful of 1920s cases, the ACLU’s lawyers
explicitly borrowed conservatives’ constitutional arguments, including congressional
power, substantive due process, even freedom of contract. 171 As they repeated those
claims with increasing frequency and fervor, some came to internalize them. As they won
in the courts, they moderated their skepticism. What began as an overtly instrumentalist
approach became a genuine belief in law’s neutrality. “We are neither anti-labor nor prolabor,” Roger Baldwin reflected in 1940. “With us it is just a question of going wherever
the Bill of Rights leads us.” 172
In one sense, there can be no better case through which to study why social actors
pursue constitutional strategies than a group of disabused progressive reformers whose
earlier efforts to effect social change succumbed to constitutional claims by their
perceived oppressors. These were no doe-eyed adherents to an inherited tradition of
constitutional celebration. They were acutely aware of both the pitfalls and power of a
court-based, constitutional approach. But the same strategic awareness that makes their
reflections on constitutionalism so poignant may also render them outliers in the historic
struggle for constitutional rights. Perhaps their self-conscious strategizing bears little
resemblance to later generations of rights claimants: racial minorities, women, gay men
and lesbians, and other aspiring beneficiaries of constitutional legitimacy. Perhaps by
investing in judicially enforceable constitutional rights, civil libertarian cynics restored a
bit of their mythical sheen.
At bottom, the ambivalence and experimentation of the interwar ACLU serve as a
reminder that our legal regime is neither timeless nor inevitable. It was the product of
political circumstances and practical choices: increasingly sympathetic judicial
appointments, unprecedented threats to business interests, widespread skepticism toward
the legitimacy of the courts. In the run-up to the Constitutional Revolution, even the most
impassioned defenders of the courts were not naïve. They sought to rehabilitate the
judiciary because they deemed it preferable for particular ends, channeled through
particular theoretical precepts. When today we recite old mantras about the value of
unfettered discussion, the dangers of state suppression, and the unique capacity of the
courts to constrain majoritarian abuses, we would do well to remember how and why
historical actors manufactured those commitments. If our ends are not theirs, we might
ask whether other ideals and institutions are better suited to achieving them.
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